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PART A
[In 2003] I went to one of the large carriers and I told them, ‘You won’t believe the explosion of PCto-PC calling we’re seeing at SIPphone.’ He said, ‘You know, geeks might talk to each other on
PCs, but I don’t see normal people using their PCs to make calls.’ And I was struck by a very similar
conversation I had about seven years ago with the record labels when I said, ‘You won’t believe
what’s happening, people are listening to music on their computers.’ And I remember them saying,
‘Well, we don’t think the average person is going to listen to music on a computer.’ And you tried to
explain to them, ‘Well, look, you can do so much more with a computer—you can organize your
music and make playlists and burn CDs.’ They couldn’t get it.
Michael Roberson, CEO of SIPphone [Rojas 2005]

I. INTRODUCTION 1, 2
The early fall of 2005 was full of speculation about the future of the major Internet players Google, Yahoo, and eBay.
In the constant struggle to gain market share and to extend their user bases, the three companies were looking to
Internet communication service provision as a potential target for market extension. Yahoo started the reign of deals
when it acquired Dialpad, a Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VOIP) communications provider, and its user base of 14
million in June 2005 for an undisclosed amount. Google soon reacted by releasing its own VOIP service, Google
Talk, in late August.
While it was expected that the two leading Internet portals would make a move toward acquiring VOIP capabilities, it
came as a surprise when eBay, the world’s leading online marketplace, announced plans to purchase Skype SA, a
European VOIP provider in September 2005. The deal, potentially worth more than USD 4 billion, was rationalized
with synergies between eBay’s business lines and as an acquisition of a user growth engine. Although eBay had
been successful in the past with integrating of new businesses such as PayPal, many outside observers had doubts
whether the acquisition of an unrelated business was a wise business decision:
Had eBay overpaid for potential synergies amid the market pressures for a service that it could easily have leased or
was it positioning itself to become a major player in a USD 2 trillion telecommunications industry?

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF VOIP AND THE IP TELEPHONY MARKET
Internet Protocol telephony (IP telephony), or voice over IP (VOIP), referred to voice calls that were transmitted over
an IP network such as the Internet, rather than over the familiar circuit switched telephone network (PSTN). In a
PSTN, telephone calls were routed based on a destination number and the geographical location of the called user.
Thus, in a circuit switched network, first a connection was established before a call can begin. The topology of the
telephone operator owned network dictated how calls were routed.
In the IP process, data were packetized, sent to a specific IP address and then reassembled at the destination.
Packets were routed and rerouted through network hosts without a predetermined route until they arrived at the
destination. Thus, no given package had to take the same route or to use the same network as the other associated
packets. As such, IP-based communication did not require a proprietary infrastructure. However, since IP was a
connectionless protocol, data corruption, out-of-order delivery of the packets or lost packets were common
occurrences. While those effects could be mitigated through transmission of redundant packets, it provided
challenges for the time critical delivery of voice data.
IP telephony evolved parallel to the Internet. In the late 1970s, experiments to transmit voice over ARPANET, the
predecessor of the Internet, were undertaken. While these experiments demonstrated the capabilities of IP
telephony, only some of the few individuals with access to ARPANET used these applications. The end user
1
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adoption of the WWW, fueled by the availability of the Netscape browser in 1995, led to the development of
commercial VOIP applications.

Early Commercialization
Released in March 1995, VocalTec’s InternetPhone was one of the first VOIP software applications available to the
public. Priced at USD 49.99 for two licenses, the software allowed free PC-to-PC calls between users who had
installed the software client. The application included features such as a user-friendly interface, chat capabilities,
collaboration tools such as white boards, and a directory of users online [Keating 1996].
While the client was quite sophisticated for its time, there were several technical hurdles that prevented mainstream
adoption of the InternetPhone application and IP telephony in general. First, VOIP required high bandwidth to
achieve satisfactory sound quality. At the time, most end users connected to their Internet Service provider via 14.4
or 28.8 Kbit modems. The most common approach to counter the bandwidth restrictions was to compress the
packets. However, the early compression standards required processing power that most PCs could not provide at
the time. Moreover, the lack of standard interfaces for auxiliary devices such as soundcards, more often than not led
to compatibility issues.
The result of these early hurdles was a subpar user experience. The lack of bandwidth and processing power led to
delays in the transmission and lost packages. Most of the time, only one user could speak; pauses during the
conversation were the norm. However, despite the low quality of service, certain applications, such as overseas
calling led to adoption. One early adopter summarized his IP telephony experience in 1996:
VocalTech (Internet Phone) and maybe half a dozen other outfits are offering phone-like service
over the Internet. Right now it's a bit like ham radio. But it's very intelligible and very usable as a
social medium and even for business. Which am I going to opt for—the kind of quality that lets me
hear a pin fall in the background for about $100 an hour to talk to someone in Europe, or just
enough quality at no charge beyond what I pay my Internet access carrier (about 30 cents an hour).
[Seltzer 1996]
In the fall of 1996, a major step toward improving the quality of IP communications was undertaken. At that time, the
ITU-I, the telecommunications standardization sector sanctioned by the United Nations, approved the H.323
standard as the international standard for multimedia communications over packet-based networks. The standard
adoption had three major outcomes. First, it minimized hardware configuration issues that had slowed adoption of
VOIP services in the past. Second, the unified standard allowed connections between the formerly separate
software clients, increasing the network of users that could call each other. Third, and most importantly, H.323 also
provided a gateway to the PSTN network, allowing for PC to landline calls.
Net2Phone was one of the first companies to take advantage of the new standard. In 1997, it added PC-to-Phone
services to its existing PC-to PC service. By 1999, Net2Phone was the clear market leader in the VOIP market,
claiming 1.5 million registered users. Despite being unprofitable at the time, the company received investments by
Softbank and AOL. The initial public offering in July raised USD 80 million for 12 percent of its shares followed by
the sale of an equal share for USD 384 million just five months later. Despite its success with the capital markets,
Net2Phone never managed to live up to its promises. 2003 was the first profitable year for Net2Phone. By then the
market capitalization had dropped to less than 5 percent of its initial value [2004].
Several factors led to the demise of Net2Phone. From a market perspective, the Internet bubble had burst and
investors were shying away from unprofitable companies. More importantly, users never switched to making VOIP
calls, despite the potential cost savings. From a user perspective, calling from the PC was still inconvenient. Starting
up the PC, plugging in the microphone and dealing with an unaccustomed user interface, did not lend itself to
making a quick phone call [Wong 2003]. Moreover, broadband Internet, a major factor in VOIP quality, was only
starting to be adopted in U.S. households.
By 2003, the VOIP market in the U.S. was highly segmented. There were numerous niche providers of PC-to-PC
services that allowed their users to call each other. Also, MSN and Yahoo had equipped their Instant Messengers
with voice capabilities. However, there was still a lack of interoperability between networks, leading to the
inconvenience of having to use multiple clients to reach various contacts. In the PC-to-Phone segment, Vonage had
become the new market leader. The Vonage service was marketed as a landline replacement, by offering hardware
that would work independently of a software client and that could utilize existing telephones. However, pricing similar
to existing PSTN contracts and the varying call quality only led to modest adoption. By 2003, only 150,000 paying
Vonage subscribers were active [2005].
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Skype SA
Skype SA was the brainchild and second startup of Niklas Zennström and Janus Friis. Rather than focusing on a
specific market, they focused on the possibilities of peer-to-peer (P2P) technology. In 2004, Zennström recollected:
“When Janus and I started [...] our vision was that peer-to-peer technology was kind of a fundamental technology
that could be used for a whole lot of different business areas [Oakes 2004].”
Their first venture was Kazaa. After the legally induced demise of Napster for providing a centralized database that
listed the locations of copyrighted files, Kazaa soon became the peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing network of choice. It
gained popularity since it was completely decentralized and outside the reach of U.S. authorities, being
headquartered in the Netherlands. Much like Napster, it enabled its users to search, share, and trade digital assets
such as documents, music, and movies. By the fall of 2001, Kazaa had more than 5 million users.
Kazaa did not earn money from the actual trades but by bundling its client software with Adware and Spyware such
as Cydoor or Webhancer [Cave 2001]. Yet the music industry argued that Kazaa indirectly profited from the
infringement committed by its users and sued Kazaa. Under tremendous legal pressure and with costs mounting,
Zennström and Friis knew they had to move on. In January 2002 the pair sold Kazaa for $500,000 to Sharman
Networks, a company incorporated in Vanuatu in the South Pacific. "To make it work, we would have had to be very
savvy about the music business, and that was not our strength," says Zennström. "So we thought, 'Let's try the next
incarnation of this' [Foroohar and McGinn 2005]." The lessons from the Kazaa experience were clear: To turn their
deep knowledge of P2P technology into a commercially successful venture, they needed to have a clear-cut revenue
model that would steer clear of legal trouble.
In the summer of 2002, the two decided to tackle the USD 1 billion communications industry. They formed the
ambitious goal of providing a free and easy-to-use application that would enable users to have free telephone
conversations over the Internet, eventually replacing landline phones. Being backed by small venture capital
investments and supported by the same programming group that aided them to create Kazaa, they started their new
venture in a small office in Luxembourg.
Within a year, the first beta version of their software was launched, enabling PC-to-PC telephony. Radically different
from the traditional telecommunication companies, Skype incurred hardly any infrastructure-related fixed costs. By
using VOIP, they utilized the free Internet infrastructure, and by deploying P2P distribution, they used the idle
computing resources of their users rather than their own expensive servers.
The first beta version was launched in 2003, enabling only PC-to-PC telephony. Less than two months after the
release of the first beta version, more than 1.5 million users had downloaded the Skype application. Within a year,
this number had risen by over 100 million with more than 1.2 billion PC-to-PC voice minutes served. More
importantly, in July 2004, Skype finally started to generate revenue by introducing the paid-for PC-to-Phone service
branded SkypeOut. Priced between USD .02 per minute, for calls to landlines in mature telecommunication markets,
to USD 1.46 per minute to calls to East Timor, more than 2 million SkypeOut calls were undertaken in the first month
alone [Zennström 2006].3 By March 2005, more than 1 million customers had purchased and used SkypeOut. In
June 2005, Skype added two more premium services: SkypeIn (a virtual local number that enables landline users to
call the Skype user) and Voicemail. The second anniversary of the initial product launch revealed staggering
numbers [2005b]:
-

More than 150 million downloads in 225 countries and territories

-

More than 51 million people registered users (150,000 new users per day)

-

More than 12 billion minutes served (equating to more than 45 percent of all U.S. VOIP traffic)

-

More than 2 million people created accounts for Skype’s paid services

Besides its core business, Skype also developed a vast network of thousands of partners and developers building
hardware and software products, as well services around the Skype experience.
At the time of the acquisition Skype was still an unprofitable business. Revenue had increased from an estimated
USD 7 million in the first year to nearly USD 60 million in the fiscal year of 2005. Gross margin was estimated at
about 18 percent of the revenues, mainly due to the high cost of the landline connection fees [Blodget 2007a].
However, Skype had managed to develop a successful product and become the VOIP market leader in the course

3
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of two years, using only USD 35 million in venture capital. It did not take long for the traditional telecommunication
companies and other interested players to notice this exponential growth fueled by viral marketing of a great service.

III. EBAY INC
Founded in 1995, eBay Inc. had become a global powerhouse of online marketplaces, acting as a broker to facilitate
transactions between buyers and sellers across a wide range of goods and services. What began as an auction site
for collectibles had developed into a wide spectrum of possibilities across virtually every product category
imaginable.
In 2005, the two pillars of eBay’s business were the eBay marketplace and the PayPal payments unit. The eBay
management described its role in the marketplace as that of a “trading platform”:
[eBay] marketplace exists as an online trading platform that enables a global community of buyers
and sellers to interact and trade with one another. Our role is to create, maintain, and expand the
functionality, safety, ease-of-use, and reliability of our trading platform while, at the same time,
supporting the growth and success of our community of users. [eBay Inc. 2005]
The eBay platform included software tools and services that allowed buyers and sellers to trade with one another
more easily and more efficiently. Software tools and services helped automating the selling process and aided in the
shipment process. Moreover, PayPal facilitated the online exchange of funds and provides fraud protection.
Table 1. eBay Inc: Net Transaction Revenues by Type (in USD 000)
2002
2003
2004
U.S. Marketplace
718,239
1,024,915
1,338,715
International Marketplace
297,485
657,874
1,157,472
Payments (PayPal)
93,303
429,453
680,813
Total net transaction revenues
1,109,027
2,112,242
3,177,000
Advertising and other revenues
105,073
52,854
94,309
Total net revenues
1,214,100
2,165,096
3,271,309
Aside from internal improvements driven by its vast community, eBay relied on external partnerships and
acquisitions both to improve the transaction experience and to increase its share of transaction fees. Services such
as the global payments platform, trust and safety programs, user verification, buyer protection and assurance
programs, postage and other shipping services, vehicle inspections, escrow, and authentication and appraisal
services were intended to create a faster, easier, and safer trading environment.

Business Model and Investment Strategy
Meg Whitman, the CEO of eBay Inc. at the time of the acquisition, had long held the notion that eBay’s core
competence was the connection of buyers and sellers [2006]. The marketplace initially connected parties in an
auction format for used or overstocked items. With eBay Express, sellers and buyers of new items were connected.
In the same vein, PayPal provided a platform where parties can facilitate transactions, regardless of their actual
bank accounts or preferred currency.
PayPal, acquired in 2002 for USD 1.5 billion, was both the most expensive and most influential of eBay’s
investments. At the time of purchase in July 2002, PayPal account holders numbered 16 million, with 295,000
payment transactions taking place every day. Moreover, an estimated 25-to-40 percent of transactions taking place
on eBay were settled through PayPal [Kane 2002]. By the end of 2004, PayPal had become an integral eBay
business model, contributing nearly 20 percent of total net revenue and posting more than one-third of its 64 million
accounts as active.
Although the eBay marketplace was the preeminent auction site on the Web, eBay had extended its business model
beyond market matching and transaction facilitation. By 2005, eBay had also made numerous investments in the
sales-lead business, such its 25 percent ownership of craigslist.com (a free classified site), the acquisition of
Shopping.com (price comparison portal), and Rent.com. While the eBay portfolio seems diversified, all investments
were targeted to either create sales leads prior to a transaction (shopping.com) or to remove friction from the
transaction (PayPal), which aimed to strengthen the core business of the marketplace by increasing the volume of
transactions, by growing the revenue share of the conducted transactions, and by making transactions more efficient
and convenient.
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While those investments showed promise to grow eBay in the long run, it also became clear that eBay needed to
find more innovative and disruptive technology to continue the streak of growing net revenue at nearly 50 percent
annually.

IV. THE ACQUISITION OF SKYPE
In 2005, the VOIP industry became the target of heavy private investment and takeover speculation. Fueled by the
market penetration of broadband Internet, Vonage Inc. had surpassed the 1 million subscriber mark by early
September and had secured more than USD 600 million in private funding. Yahoo Inc. also invested in the VOIP
business, buying Dialpad and its 14 million customer base for an undisclosed amount. Moreover, Google refrained
from buying an external provider, instead introducing GoogleTalk in late August.
Skype SA was rumored to be a target for all the aforementioned companies [Kewney 2005]. The potential suitors
viewed acquisition of Skype SA as a preventative move which would certainly hurt the companies that failed to buy
the VOIP market leader. However, Zennström did not simply want to sell Skype and see the company dismantled by
its suitor. He favored a solution where Skype would be acquired but could still operate as a stand-alone company:
You've seen it so many times when technology companies are acquiring small companies and one
year after you don't see those companies anymore because they got completely dismantled. This
happens like when Cisco, or Microsoft or some other company is acquiring companies. We said
Skype needed to be a separate company so that you can still foster the growth and the innovation of
the company but we should take advantage of synergies when we have them. [Steinberg 2006]
When eBay approached Skype SA, Zennström saw the chance to fulfill his vision, drawing parallels to PayPal.
PayPal had developed into the premier payment-processing provider by utilizing both the eBay marketplace
transactions and developing its merchant services for independent e-commerce merchants. Thus, PayPal had the
best of both worlds: It leveraged eBay’s platform to grow its network, which in turn made it more attractive for
merchants to adopt PayPal payment processing.
EBay’s management also was intrigued by the striking similarities. Just like eBay and PayPal in their early days,
Skype posted tremendous growth numbers fueled by viral marketing and the concurrent network effect. Moreover,
Skype was already the market leader in VOIP communication service provisions, and its paid services were just
starting to take off. Thus, the business would be able to sustain itself without further subsidies. In addition to being a
successful stand-alone business, eBay could also foresee vital synergies if the acquisition occurred. Skype could
augment eBay in two dimensions: volume and network effects across the subsidiaries.
Two key areas were expected to increase eBay’s transaction volume: the increased user base and the
establishment of lucrative high-priced auctions. Skype had a user base that was strikingly complementary. With 84
percent of Skype users registered outside the U.S. and, according to Nielsen NetRatings, with an only 1 percent
overlap of eBay U.S. and Skype users, there was a ready-made customer network of 50 million potential eBay users
that was growing by 150,000 every day. Besides the European contingent, Skype users were mainly located in fastgrowing economies such as India, China, and Russia where eBay or any other online marketplace had yet to
become a dominant force. Through Skype, the penetration in those markets could be accelerated. In addition, eBay
also envisioned that live or open-cry auctions would be enabled through the Skype voice and one-to-many video
conferencing technology. In the same vein, it was anticipated that high price and communication intensive
categories such as art and antiques would increase.
Second, Skype’s integration was anticipated to foster cross-marketing among the different eBay brands. The
management envisioned that Skype could be integrated into eBay auctions to facilitate more intimate
communications. Moreover, with PayPal already accounting for roughly 20 percent of Skype’s transaction
processing, a money-wire per call or integrated paid-call service model was easy to conceive. Lastly, the Skype
integration also was seen as vital to strengthening the sales-lead and classified business.
eBay proceeded with the acquisition process by offering a two tiered deal that was accepted by the Skype SA
shareholders in October 2007. The first part of the offer included an immediate purchase price of USD 2.6 billion,
payable in eBay stocks. In addition, a performance based earn-out was negotiated. If Skype would achieve
undisclosed performance metrics over the next four years, the Skype owners could receive an additional USD 1.7
billion. Moreover, key Skype personnel had to commit to work for the newly formed eBay subsidiary for the next few
years.
In an investor conference call following the acquisition announcement, ebay’s CEO at the time, Meg Whitman,
summarized that:
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Communications is at the heart of e-commerce and community. By combining the two leading ecommerce franchises, eBay and PayPal, with the leader in Internet voice communications, we will
create an extraordinarily powerful environment for business on the Net [Neilan and Belson 2005].
[which will deliver] unparalleled e-commerce and communications engine [by] removing a key point
of friction between buyers and sellers. [Broache 2005]
While Whitman’s predictions were enthusiastic, the market voiced a more skeptical opinion.

Reactions to the Acquisition
The reactions to the acquisitions were mixed at best. In the week after the announcement, eBay shares fell nearly 4
percent [2005a]. Besides the heavy price tag of USD 2.6 billion (plus a potential USD 1.7 billion in performance
earn-outs), the distancing from the core business was the main concern voiced by analysts and industry experts.
Industry observers were quick to observe that most of the previous investments were led by the needs and feedback
of the users [Hof 2005]. One reason to purchase PayPal, despite the previous USD 100 million investment in
BidPay, was its user acceptance. Powersellers voiced their concern that Skype neither added to existing capabilities
nor would change the way they conduct business on eBay [Berr 2005]. John Hagel went as far as questioning
eBay’s core business by proclaiming that Skype was just another high-multiple purchase that would divert from the
marketplace’s slowing growth and saturation, resembling purchases undertaken at the height of the Internet bubble.
He further doubted whether a partnership would have been a cheaper and more reasonable alternative to the
acquisition [Hagel 2005].
While the synergy and network effects were generally dismissed, support of the acquisition persisted. Martin
Geddes, a telecommunications analyst, noted that it was simply an attack at another industry that generated huge
revenues while lacking to innovate:
Just like PayPal was a business model that disrupted the banking industry, the acquisition of Skype
is eBay’s attempt to take its slice out of the telecommunications companies’ revenues using an
innovative technology. [Geddes 2005]

V. QUESTIONS
1. How have the IP telephony market and the service offerings changed in the last 10 years?
2. Why should eBay buy Skype when it can lease it?
3. Why would eBay pay so much (USD 2.6 billion plus a potential USD 1.7 billon earn-out)?
4. What service possibilities arise from the integration of eBay-Skype-PayPal?
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PART B:
Skype has been an incredible adventure and I am proud to have been part of it. Looking back at
2003, at two guys running around with a crazy idea of building a global phone company purely on
the Internet, moving from one rented apartment to another, still battling a major lawsuit from our
Kazaa days, 2003 seems a long time ago. It is amazing to think that it is only four years!
Janus Friis – Co-Founder of Skype SA, October 1, 2007

I. INTRODUCTION
October 2007 marked both the fourth anniversary of the release of Skype’s first public beta and the second
anniversary of eBay’s acquisition of Skype SA. It also was a month of change and reassessment of the progress of
the Skype integrations as the third pillar of eBay’s business model.
The month started out with the announcement that co-founder Niklas Zennström would leave eBay to focus on his
newest startup, Joost, and his venture capital company, Atomico. On the same day, eBay also announced that the
Skype shareholders would receive USD 530 million in earn-outs, which was roughly one-third of the maximum
payout of USD 1.7 billon that was negotiated during the Skype acquisition two years earlier.
Later that month, eBay also reported its third-quarter earnings, which showed growth in Skype’s revenue and user
base as well as profitability for the third straight quarter. The month was capped with announcements of Skype’s
final integration into all categories of the eBay marketplace, an integration of Skype into MySpace, and an
integration of Facebook content into the Skype client. Yet, despite the growing success of Skype, eBay also
announced a goodwill write-off of USD 900 million, which decreased Skype’s book value to USD 2.2 billion and led
to eBay posting the first unprofitable quarter in more than eight years.
Were the pessimistic predictions that many industry observers voiced two years earlier coming true?

II. ZENNSTRÖM RESIGNS AS CEO OF SKYPE
As with most serial entrepreneurs, it was expected that Zennström would leave eBay at some point in time. While
the original earn-out period was scheduled for four years, Zennström had more interest in pursuing his newest
venture. He envisioned changing TV distribution the same way Skype had changed the telecommunications
industry. Thus, IPTV became the new focus. Simply put, leveraging the P2P distribution to provide Internet
Television on steroids. The name of the fledgling company was appropriate: Joost (pronounced “juiced”).
In fact, the announcement of his departure coincided with the public release of the Joost Beta version. While most of
the industry observers equated the smaller earn-out as a sign of Skype failing to meet its growth and revenue
expectations, it was nothing short of remarkable to have sold a company for more than USD 3.2 billion after only four
years of market presence. Co-founder Janus Friis put the “failure” in perspective:
Earn-outs are inherently difficult creatures, but we are happy with the result of this one. We are
approximately half way into the earn-out period and the settlement amounts to one-third of the total
possible earn-out amount. [Friis 2007b]
Despite the fact that the lofty expectations toward Skype’s performance were not met, the growth in revenue and
user base was still remarkable. Since its acquisition two years earlier, Skype had nearly quintupled its registered
user base to over 240 million. Also, revenue for the fiscal year of 2007 was expected to exceed USD 400 million,
which was an increase of more than 650 percent compared to the year of the acquisition [Schonfeld 2007]. In
addition, Skype had managed to become profitable for every quarter in 2007 [eBay Inc. 2007]. The eBay
management was quick to add that Zennström move to the position of non-executive chairman of Skype would not
change the long-term strategy of the subsidiary [Musich 2007].

III. GROWING SKYPE AS A STAND-ALONE BUSINESS
In its two years as an eBay subsidiary, Skype management had focused key drivers for growing its user base:
further accelerating the viral adoption of the client and continuously releasing new software clients to adapt to the
users’ evolving needs.

Accelerating the Viral Growth
On a global scale, Skype continued the exponential growth of its user base. Since the acquisition, the number of
registered users increased from 50 million to nearly 250 million. The growth was mainly attributed to the viral power
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of Skype. Yet, on a regional basis, Skype adoption varied. While Europe and Asia posted strong growth rates, the
U.S. was lagging behind. To increase the popularity of Skype in North America, the company offered free SkypeOut
calls within the U.S. and Canada from spring 2006 until the end of the year. Yet, as SkypeOut minutes increased by
40 percent over that time span, the revenue share of U.S. users did not rise during the promotional period or in the
first three quarters of 2007.

Enhancing the Software Client
The second driver of user growth involved introducing new features and fostering innovation of complementary
hardware accessories. With Version 2.0, released in December 2005, Skype introduced video conferencing. Initially
only employed for one-to-one calls, the feature evolved, creating the new capacity for one-to-many SkypeCasts. In
May 2006, Skype 2.5 enhanced this feature enabling many-to-many video calls, thus evolving into a cheap
alternative for global videoconferences. This version also incorporated SMS for as little as USD .01 as an attempt to
tap into the USD 40 billon text messaging market [2008a]. Skype 2.5 also introduced better usability features such
as the automated import of email contacts and categorization of contacts into groups.
Staying on pace to release an overhauled version every six months, the Beta version of 3.0 became available in
November 2006. Most of the features, such as personalization of the client and design overhauls, were usabilityoriented. To further foster SkypeOut calls, 3.0 also included browser integration by offering its “click to call feature,”
which recognized phone numbers displayed on Web pages, automatically converting them into a direct link that
would launch a SkypeOut call upon a click. The latest version was geared towards features that would mimic
modern telephone systems. Version 3.5 included features such as call transfer, automatic redial, and the integration
into MS Outlook, all clearly targeted at business users.

Setbacks of Growth and Continuous Innovation
The growing popularity also had negative effects. In September 2007, a software worm spread quickly through the
Skype network, raising Skype-related security concerns and causing many systems administrators to temporality
block Skype traffic. While the worm did not cause any harm, it was a reminder that Skype had to address security to
cater to business clients. This was particularly important after a Skype service outage a month earlier caused severe
criticism of how the situation was handled and raised the question of whether Skype really was a reliable landline
replacement [Blodget 2007b].
Despite the setbacks, the new features were embraced by the user community. On average, half a million clients
were downloaded every day, amounting to more than 700 million total downloads of the different Skype clients by
the end of October 2007. At the same time, Skype also was able to eclipse the mark of 10 million concurrent users,
increasing by tenfold the 1 million concurrent users it had only three years earlier [Mercier 2007].
An eBay spokesperson summarized Skype’s performance: “We feel like we can do a lot more with Skype as a
stand-alone VoIP provider. Skype has been focused on user acquisition and it's done a great job. But we also feel
like we can find new ways to monetize those users” [Reardon 2007].

IV. GROWING THE REVENUE
Soon after the 2006 promotional period of free SkypeOut calls in North America ended, Skype introduced a new
pricing structure and features to grow the VOIP revenue per user. In January 2007, Skype changed the SkypeOut
pricing structure by adding a connection fee of USD .045 for every call placed. At the same time, it also offered
SkypePro, which included a lower per-call fee and discounted fees on features such as SkypeIn and voicemail, but
required a monthly subscription fee of USD 3. There were a few outcries about the changing pricing structure, but
despite the expected drop-off from users who only used SkypeOut while it was free, paid voice minutes grew
proportionally to the number of users added [Friis 2007a]. However, in fall 2007, evidence emerged showing that the
usage of SkypeOut was declining. Despite the continuous growth of the user base, the total number of SkypeOut
minutes had stagnated at 1.4 billons in each quarter in 2007. One industry analyst noted that” Skype's core business
isn't much different from a really cheap calling card business. The margins are really thin” [Reardon 2007].4
To diversify revenue streams, Skype introduced other telephony services and pricing packages. SkypeUnlimited was
offered as a flat rate for in-country calls for a monthly flat fee of USD 3. SkypeFind, a directory listing service, was
introduced as a platform for premium calls that were usually associated with 0900 numbers. SkypePrime enabled
service providers to set their own price for offerings such as consulting that could be conducted via the Skype client.

4

Please refer to Table 2 in the appendix of the revenue cost structure of IDT Corp, the worlds leading provider of calling card based voice traffic

Volume 24

Article 6

97

In addition to internal developments, Skype actively promoted third-party services and products in an effort to further
increase the paid voice and licensing revenues.
From a financial perspective, Skype slowly picked up steam. The first three quarters of 2007 were all profitable. The
revenue had steadily grown and was expected to be close to USD 400 million in the 2007 fiscal year. However,
there were also signs that the monetization per user did not seem to increase. On average, every registered user
had only generated approximately USD .40 per quarter since 2006. Also, not only did the volume of paid SkypeOut
minutes stay flat in 2007, the actual number of free Skype-to-Skype minutes actually declined, raising concerns that
after the initial hype, more and more power users were switching to competitive services. (See Table 2 in the
appendix for selected financial and usage data.)

Integration Efforts
Synergies with the other eBay business lines were the main justification for the acquisition of Skype. The effort was
dubbed “The Power of Three,” indicating that three stand-alone growth businesses could be even more successful if
they were integrated across the three businesses. The first integration took place between Skype and Paypal.
Touted as a VOIP-enabled “Western Union,” Skype’s version 2.5, released in May 2006, was expected to include
functionalities to send and receive payments from contacts with a click of a button. Yet, the feature did not appear
until March 2007, raising questions as to why the integration of the already preferred payment provider was taking
so long.
The same criticism was voiced over the integration of Skype into the eBay marketplace. Although the Dutch eBay
subsidiary marktplaats.nl started a pilot integration in October 2005, eBay was slow to introduce Skype on a global
scale [2005c]. After pilots in other European countries, the SkypeMe button, allowing instant calls to the sellers, was
first rolled out in selected U.S. categories in June 2006. EBay justified its slow roll out as an adoption experiment
citing that it did not want to confuse its sellers with unfamiliar features. Yet the resistance of sellers to use voice
features in general seemed also to have played an important role in the decision [Hof 2006]. In fall 2007, Skype
finally was integrated into all eBay categories. In the process, eBay also banned all other voice services from its site,
stating that only eBay-owned Skype could be used to facilitate marketplace-related voice communication [Steiner
2007].
It was unclear what the results of the delayed integration would be. But it was apparent that eBay was dissatisfied
with the slow progress and lack of monetization of synergies. As a result, Ebay took a goodwill write-down and
reduced the book value of Skype to USD 2.2 billion. In an effort to revamp the efforts to grow the synergies, most of
the Skype management was replaced alongside Niklas’ departure [Associated Press 2007]. While internal synergies
had yet to materialize, partnerships with third-party providers were starting to flourish.

Third-Party Applications and Accessories
On the accessory side, innovations received an enormous amount of publicity. The announcements of the release of
WIFI-enabled phones by Netgear and Keyspad were among the biggest Skype-related news items of 2006 [2007].
3G/ WIFI hybrid Amobi Phone in Europe was an instant sellout. Priced at 100 USD, the phone enabled customers of
Hutchinson’s subsidiary 3 UK to take advantage of modest Skype pricing while being within the coverage of a WIFI
hotspot. Besides the revenue from the SkypeOut calls, Skype also was expected to receive a share of the regular
phone usage and licensing fees.
Moreover, a large-scale roll out of Skype-branded accessories at Wal-Mart was announced in the summer of 2007.
While specifics of the deal were not disclosed, it was estimated that Skype commanded a licensing fee of 5 percent
of the wholesale price for Skype-branded or Skype-certified hardware products. In addition, prepaid calling cards
allowing unlimited PC to landline calls in the North America for USD 8.85 were offered. While the financial gains had
yet to materialize, it was assumed that the exposure to Wal-Mart’s large distribution network would open up new
customer segments that would use Skype’s paid services rather than just the free services offered by Skype.
Aside from the efforts to increase the monetization of its users, Skype also pushed to expand its range of services.
Originally developed as a closed application with a proprietary protocol, the Skype client soon evolved into a
programming platform. In 2005, the Skype Developer Zone opened to the public, allowing programmers to develop
applications and features by themselves. Available documentation and frequent developer competitions attracted a
wealth of volunteer developers. In the three years of its existence, the “Skype sandbox” had much to show. More
than 4,000 developers participated, creating more than 350 Skype-enabled applications [Willis 2007].
In fall 2007, Skype announced collaborations with the popular social networking sites Facebook and MySpace. On
one hand, Skype integrated popular Facebook games into its clients, giving users the chance to play with their
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friends while using Skype. Skype also started to develop games of its own, which it then planned to publish via
Facebook. Facebook games had become a hot trend, with users challenging their friends on a daily basis. Skype
wanted to leverage that phenomenon for two reasons: to raise the awareness of Skype by displaying its brand name
within the games and to put an application launcher onto the Facebook profile of each user that had added the game
[Dolcourt 2007].
The MySpace announcement was less subtle. On October 16, 2007, Skype became the official voice provider for
the network of 110 million MySpace members. Skype was to be incorporated into the MySpace Instant Messaging
client, enabling MySpace users to place free Skype calls to their friends and eventually adopt Skype as their VOIP
client of choice for paid services, as well [AFP 2007].
Both efforts were deemed as another attempt to leverage viral effects in social networks and to introduce Skype to a
younger and predominantly North American audience. However, given the track record of Skype’s integration into
the eBay marketplace, it seemed doubtful that the announced partnerships would materialize any time soon.

V. LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE
Skype had gone through a tremendous development in growing its user base, but two years after the acquisition it
was challenged to monetize that growth. Several industry observers suggested that Skype’s future was in the mobile
business, where it could offer competitive rates while earning revenues by licensing its brand name to OEM
manufacturers.
In the Internet arena, Skype was facing a VOIP market with continuously eroding margins spurred by new
competitive offerings nearly every week. Aside from the established players like Yahoo! Voice, GoogleTalk, and
Microsoft’s LiveMessenger, upstarts like JahJah and QQ, along with more than 150 VOIP providers, were fighting to
lure customers [2008b; Uberti 2007]. With a user base of 250 million, Skype was confident that the client would soon
be synonymous with VOIP communication, evolving into a de facto standard. However, the lack of interoperability
with the other networks was a concern for industry observers.
Another question was whether Skype could capitalize on the growing advertising business. While eBay initially only
foresaw integration of its own businesses, there didn’t seem to be a good reason why ads should not be served
through the client. Yet, it appeared that eBay lacked the capabilities to place context-related ads and was reluctant
to partner with competitors Google or Yahoo! to make this business line a success.
As for the integration with the other eBay businesses, the predictions were not really clear. EBay’s recent foray into
social commerce by creating more social network communities around specific categories did not seem to directly
involve the Skype application. But then again, maybe lowering expectations might be a good strategy this time
around…

VI. QUESTIONS
1. Evaluate the performance of Skype since the acquisition.
2. In retrospect, how would you evaluate the strategic move to acquire Skype and the price paid for it?
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APPENDIX
Table 2. Selected Performance and Usage Data of eBay's Communications Subsidiary Skype
05-Q4 06-Q1 06-Q2 06-Q3 06-Q4 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3
25
35
44
50
66
79
90
97
Revenues (USD million)
(delta millions)
10
9
6
16
13
11
7
(Q/Q)
40%
26%
14%
32%
20%
14%
8%
(Y/Y)
126% 105% 94%
Intl revenue
87%
87%
86%
84%
84%
85%
84%
83%
Estimated US revenue
3.25
4.55
6.16
8
10.56 11.85 14.4
16.49
Direct Contribution (USD million)

-1

-9

-8

-10

-1

3

9

14

User Accounts (million)
(delta millions)
(Q/Q)
(Y/Y)

75

95
20
27%

113
18
19%

136
23
20%

171
35
26%
128%

196
25
15%
106%

220
24
12%
95%

245.7
25.7
12%
81%

Revenue/ Account

0.33

0.37

0.39

0.37

0.39

0.40

0.41

0.39

Skype-to-Skype Minutes (billions)
(delta billions)
(Q/Q)
(Y/Y)

5.2

6.9
1.7
33%

7.1
0.2
3%

6.6
-0.5
-7%

7.6
1
15%
46%

7.7
0.1
1%
12%

7.2
-0.5
-6%
1%

6.1
-1.1
-15%
-8%

SkypeOut Minutes
(delta billions)
(Q/Q)
(Y/Y)

0.5

0.7
0.2
40%

0.9
0.2
29%

1.1
0.2
22%

1.5
0.4
36%
200%

1.5
0
0%
114%

1.3
-0.2
-13%
44%

1.4
0.1
8%
27%

5.7
7.6
8
7.7
9.1
9.2
8.5
7.5
Total Minutes
(delta billions)
1.9
0.4
-0.3
1.4
0.1
-0.7
-1
(Q/Q)
33%
5%
-4%
18%
1%
-8%
-12%
(Y/Y)
60%
21%
6%
-3%
Source: Compiled from eBay earnings release & conference calls, skypejournal.com, and
sypenumerology.com
Table 3. Selected Financial Performance and Usage Data for ITD Corp.’s Retail Calling Card Business
(million; in USD except for
2004
2005
2006
2007
minutes)
1148.1
1220.4
1,194.9
936.7
Revenues
894.8
955
980.9
750.0
Direct Cost of Revenues
253.3
265.4
214.0
186.7
Gross Profit
239.2
321
194.3
218.0
Administrative Expenses
14.1
(55.6)
19.7
(31.3)
Net Profit
15,627.0
17,224.0
16,005.0
11,217.0
Minutes of Use
Source: IDT Corp SEC Filings (Form 10K)
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Table 4. Skype-Related Pricing Information for Top, Median and Bottom 10 Countries Ranked by Annual
International Voice Traffic
Skype
Cost of
Skype
Out
Skype
call per
Skype Out Out Pricing
Out Pricing Pricing for
Rank By
minute from
Pricing for
for
Annual
for Mobile
Mobile
Landline
Landline Calls
Landline
Calls per
International
Calls per
Phone to US
Calls per
per Minute in
Minute in
Minute in
Voice Traffic
in USD (most
USD (2005)
Minute in
USD (2005)
USD
recent)
USD (2007)
(2007)
Country
1
0.0138
0.021
0.014
0.021
0.000
USA
2
0.0648
0.099
NA
0.336
0.045
Mexico
3
0.0138
0.021
0.162
0.246
0.042
Germany
4
0.0138
0.021
0.166
0.253
0.065
United Kingdom
5
0.0138
0.021
0.203
0.308
0.067
Italy
6
0.0138
0.021
0.014
0.021
0.000
Canada
7
0.0138
0.021
0.133
0.203
0.068
France
8
0.0138
0.021
0.014
0.021
0.009
China
9
0.0154
0.023
0.101
0.154
0.024
Japan
10
0.0203
0.021
0.020
0.021
0.009
Singapore
74
0.109
0.153
0.100
0.166
0.053
Ghana
75
0.154
0.234
0.172
0.261
0.069
Senegal
76
0.160
0.243
0.018
Bahrain
77
0.039
0.059
0.067
0.074
0.034
Cyprus
78
0.083
0.126
0.168
0.255
0.048
Uruguay
79
0.045
0.068
0.174
0.265
0.017
Bulgaria
80
0.247
0.376
0.249
0.378
0.000
Qatar
81
0.063
0.096
0.168
0.239
0.015
Armenia
82
0.142
0.216
0.148
0.225
0.016
Nicaragua
83
0.674
1.025
0.030
Cuba
149
0.206
0.313
0.048
Chad
150
0.262
0.398
0.046
Comoros
151
0.233
0.355
0.020
Afghanistan
152
0.170
0.259
0.003
Montserrat
153
0.101
0.154
0.093
0.142
0.023
Burundi
154
0.758
1.153
0.030
Solomon Islands
155
0.129
0.196
0.070
Central Africa
Sao Tome and
156
0.786
1.195
0.037
Principe
157
0.126
0.192
0.060
Rwanda
158
0.497
0.756
0.039
Kiribati
Average (All
0.074
0.110
0.130
0.202
0.031
Countries)
Sources: Skype.com. World Development Indicators (Most recent data available as of 10/2008)

Volume 24

Article 6

103

Table 5. Supplemental Information For Top, Median and Bottom 10 Countries Ranked by Annual
International Voice Traffic
Rank of International Voice traffic in
Internet
International
Million Minutes (incoming
Users Per Landline Telephone
Call Volume
and outgoing minutes)
100 Subscribers per 100
Country
1
82,061.25
72.9
54.1
USA
2
20,141.03
21.7
18.8
Mexico
3
15,683.00
51.7
65.3
Germany
4
15,600.00
65.9
55.2
UK
5
13,593.00
53.9
45.6
Italy
6
13,499.57
84.9
64.3
Canada
7
11,505.00
49.1
55.2
France
8
9,729.91
15.9
27.7
China
9
5,921.00
73.6
35.9
Japan
10
5,427.50
58.8
40.5
Singapore
74
452.87
2.8
1.6
Ghana
75
409.00
6.6
2.2
Senegal
76
408.16
33.2
26.3
Bahrain
77
405.19
48.3
47.8
Cyprus
78
400.00
29.2
29.1
Uruguay
79
396.34
52.3
30.1
Bulgaria
80
393.04
42.0
28.4
Qatar
81
385.76
5.7
19.7
Armenia
82
355.11
2.8
4.5
Nicaragua
83
344.50
11.6
9.3
Cuba
149
19.28
0.6
0.1
Chad
150
18.68
3.4
3.1
Comoros
151
15.62
2.1
0.3
Afghanistan
152
13.36
12.2
2.2
Montserrat
153
10.68
0.7
0.4
Burundi
154
9.65
1.7
1.5
Solomon Islands
155
8.90
0.3
0.3
Central Africa
156
8.84
14.6
4.8
Sao Tome
157
6.05
1.1
0.2
Rwanda
158
2.24
2.0
4.7
Kiribati
Average (All Countries)
3,978.15
32.2
Source: World Development Indicators (Most recent data available as of 2007)
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